identitarianism

Atom Egoyan: "born in Egypt, raised in Canada, proudly Armenian—and yet, with the notable exception of Ararat (2002), his identitarian commitments never drift into uncritical sentimentality."

Nancy Fraser... "four-celled matrix"...

"...there is a powerful looping effect in all of our identities. All identities are social constructs which get their power from being recognized by others. As a result, there is a looping effect in our identity construction, where we internalise the norms that govern our chosen (or assigned) identities. When the norms of a given identity contain a built-in mechanism for both radicalisation and self-destruction (as they do for an identity like "messed-up singer of the blues"), it is not hard to see how it could become literally inescapable." Potter informed me (via twitter) that he borrowed this idea from Ian Hacking.

See also Joseph Heath's "Problems in the Theory of Ideology"

Does being a _ist mean simply claiming the title, or doing things (making life decisions, behaving and acting, etc.) in ways that are coherently recognizable as consistently expressive of a thorough understanding of the ideas, concepts and principles that constitute _ism? However much people might like to emphasize the latter and say "that's what 'being a _ist' is all about!", it seems fairly plain that this is not really the case. 'Being a _ist', in day to day terms means claiming and defending one's right to that identity. The case one puts forward to legitimize a claim to —ist identity may indeed rely heavily on claims to have made decisions, etc. in accordance with the supposed dictates of _ism, however such evidence is at best a secondary validating element to the primary fact of //feeling// or //believing// that one //is// a _ist__.__

It's a sensible shortcut for answering what could otherwise be an insoluble question: is such-and-such person a _ist or not? Well, why not just ask them? Do they consider themselves as —ist?

Anarchist identity claims have the same structure as other —ism identities: 'being an anarchist' fits into the same pattern of circular logic, though it may be an especially extreme and arguably ironic example of it.

The trouble with identitarianism of this sort is that it leads us into a very different set of concerns that it's supposed to. Instead of focussing on the social injustices that —ism presumably offers (at least partial) solutions to, we find our energy consumed with defining, identifying, regulating and enforcing the boundaries of what constitute legitimate claims to —ist identity.

A more pragmatic conception of identity can mitigate these problems. If we can bracket the issue of self-identification — not dismiss it entirely as irrelevant, which would be to close the door an an important set of considerations (eg: psychological), but to set it aside somewhat, to foreground broader questions of coherence and consistency of practical action — we might be better able to discuss —ism as a theory and the uses and limits of its proposals for social change, rather than getting derailed by an evaluation of the quality of character of those who march under that particular banner.

Quality of character is an important subject, and an especially interesting one for many philosophers of education; however if attempts to discuss political policies and social realities can't proceed without resolving such metaphysical matters, then the prospects for positive let alone positively radical reform or revolution are dim indeed.

Value pluralism (as an idea, not, of course, a commitment to value pluralist identity) is one of the most promising remedies to this identitarian quagmire. The pluralist rejection of moral absolutism provides a threshold beyond which identity can be safely ignored: it doesn't matter what people consider themselves to 'be' if they are truly free to feel and believe whatever they want. In fact, it seems to me that the very notion of freedom of conscience implicitly requires a non-absolutist morality, which pluralism can allow for (without succumbing to the paralysis of moral relativism). And it seems transparent that anarchism entails a strong commitent to freedom of conscience.

Indeed, my argument can be summed up in the assertion that many of the most divisive debates and theoretical problems in anarchism are obviated by a genuine concern for freedom of conscience.